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ABSTRACT
Control systems for advanced aircraft, and especially those
with relaxed static stability, will be critical to flight and will,
therefore, have very high reliability specifications which must be
met for adverse as well as nominal operating conditions. Severe
operating conditions can result from electromagnetic disturbances
caused by lightning, high energy radio frequency (HERF)
transmitters, and nuclear electromagnetic pulses (NEMP). For this
reason, tools and techniques must be developed to verify the
integrity of the control system in adverse operating environments.
The most difficult and illusive perturbations to computer-based
control systems that can be caused by an electromagnetic
environment (EME) are functional error modes that involve no
component damage. These error modes are collectively known as
"upset", can occur simultaneously in all of the channels of a
redundant control system, and are software dependent. Upset
studies performed to date have not addressed the assessment of
multi-channel systems and do not involve the evaluation of a control
system operating in a closed-loop with the plant. This paper
presents a methodology for performing upset tests on a multi-
channel control system. In particular, the paper discusses
considerations for the design of upset tests to be conducted in the
laboratory on fault-tolerant control systems operating in a closed
loop with a simulated plant. Some of the considerations discussed
are the generation and coupling of analog signals representative of
electromagnetic disturbances to a control system under test, analog
data acquisition, and digital data acquisition from multi-channel
systems. In addition, the paper presents a case study of an upset
test methodology for a fault-tolerant electronic engine control
system.
I. Introduction
Advanced aircraft designs reduce aerodynamic drag via
relaxed static stability and, therefore, control systems that are
critical to the flight of the aircraft are required to maintain stability.
In addition, fuel efficiency is greatly improved in advanced designs
by using light-weight nonmetallic (composite) aircraft structures,
rather than the metal ones currently in use. The trend in avionics
technology is the implementation of control laws on digital
computers that are interfaced to the sensors and control surfaces of
the aircraft. Since digital computers are highly susceptible to
transient electrical signals, the use of digital controls compounds the
problem already incurred through the use of composite structures
which do not provide the electrical shielding inherent in metal. As
the function of the control system becomes more flight critical and
the use of composite materials becomes more widespread, the
problem of verifying the integrity of the control in adverse, as well
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as nominal, operating environments becomes a key issue in the
development of a control system.
One particularly harsh operating environment results from the
presence of electromagnetic fields caused by sources such as
lightning, high energy radio frequency (HERF) transmitters, and
nuclear electromagnetic pulses (NEMP). As shown in Fig. 1, sources
such as lightning, HERF, and NEMP generate electromagnetic fields
outside of the aircraft which are dependent on the aircraft's
geometry and structural material. These exterior electromagnetic
fields penetrate the aircraft by leaking through joints, seams, and
apertures so that interior electromagnetic fields are present. The
interior fields cause analog electrical transients to be induced on the
aircraft's wiring, and these signals can propagate to the onboard
electronic equipment despite shielding and protective devices such
as filters and surge suppressors. There are two types of effects to
digital computer systems that can be caused by transient electrical
signals. The first is actual component damage that requires repair or
replacement of the equipment. The second type of damage to a
digital system is characterized by functional error modes collectively
known as "upset" which involve no component damage. In the case
of upset, normal operation can be restored to the system by
corrective action such as resetting/reloading the software or by an
internal recovery mechanism, such as an automatic rollback to a
system state just prior to the disturbance. The subject of effective
internal upset recovery mechanisms is another current topic for
research. See reference [1] for a more detailed account of the
electromagnetic threat to advanced digital avionics systems.
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To date, there are no comprehensive guidelines or criteria for
performing tests or analyses on digital control systems to evaluate
upset susceptibility or verify control integrity in electromagnetically
adverse operating environments. Therefore, the objective of this
research is to develop a methodology whereby a digital computer-
based control system can be evaluated for upset susceptibility as
well as control integrity when subjected to analog transient electrical
signals like those that would be induced by an electromagnetic
source. The electromagnetic source under consideration in this
research is lightning. This paper discusses various issues in the
design and implementation of upset tests which can be performed in
the laboratory on a candidate fault-tolerant control system. A case
study is described involving the upset test design of a full-authority
electronic engine controller (EEC).
II. Upset Test Design for Fault-Tolerant Control Systems
Most upset studies conducted to date have involved general-
purpose systems executing a generic application code during testing
[2] - [6]. One upset study involved the evaluation of an Inertial
Navigation System that was subjected to transient signals like those
that could result from NEMP [7]. Since none of these studies involved
a control system _that has closed-loop dynamics with a plant, it is
desirable that an upset methodology be formulated for such a
system. The general laboratory test configuration for the upset
evaluation of a control system is shown in Fig. 2. As shown in the
figure, the test configuration involves two control units the unit
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under test and an unperturbed reference unit. The controller under
test is perturbed by transient signals like those that could be induced
by lightning. Each controller is interfaced to a simulation (hardware
or software) of the plant in such a manner as to represent the closed-
loop dynamics of the system. The operation of the two plant
simulations are compared during tests so that cases in which
acceptable control is not maintained by the faulted controller can be
flagged in real time. Data obtained from the controllers during tests
are stored for post processing and analysis. An alternative to having
a faulted and reference controller is to have one controller which
would be run with the plant simulation without faults for a period of
time in a so-called "gold run". Unfaulted data would be recorded
from the controller as well as the nominal operating parameters of
the plant. Then, the plant parameter data obtained during faulted
runs would be compared after testing to the nominal data and a
determination made regarding the control integrity of the faulted
controller. Since use of the two controllers would save a step in data
processing, it is advantageous to use this configuration if two
prototype controllers are available.
A. Generation of Analog Transients in the Laboratory
The waveform, shown in Fig. 3, that is most representative of
those that occur on internal aircraft wiring due to lightning is a 1 -
50 MHz damped sinusoid which decreases in amplitude 50 75 %
after four cycles [8]. This waveform can be generated by a capacitor
discharge circuit with light damping [9]. However, use of a simple
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RLC circuit is awkward because components must be changed in
order to generate key frequencies in the 1 - 50 MHz range. Three
pulse generators have been designed to fulfill the electromagnetic
test requirements of the Royal Aerospace Establishment [10]. One
pulse generator produces damped sinusoidal waveforms from 2 - 30
MHz, one is a fixed-frequency 100 kHz generator, and the third
produces two waveforms for ground voltage lightning effects
simulation.
The most versatile way to generate the transient signal, and
the technique presented here, is a polynomial waveform synthesizer,
which generates the waveform that corresponds to the entered
equation. The output of the waveform generator can then be scaled
to the proper amplitude via a wideband power amplifier. In this
way, transient signals can be easily generated that cover a frequency
range of interest and represent the induced effects of any
electromagnetic source.
B. Coupling Analog Transients to the Controller Under Test
The mechanism for coupling analog signals into the digital
controller must be such that the controller is not loaded down by
mismatched impedance. In addition, the coupling mechanism must
be representative of that which would occur in the natural operating
environment, depicted in Fig. 1. The most widely used coupling
techniques are resistive and inductive coupling. An advantage to
resistive coupling is that no special equipment is needed. In
addition, it is very easy using resistive coupling to inject transient
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signals into integrated circuit pins as well as printed circuit board
test points. The coupling method which best satisfies the above
criteria is to induce voltage into a cable or cable bundle using a
ferrite coupling transformer that can be clamped around the cable or
bundle. Details of performing such tests are given in [I1] and [12].
Another consideration is whether the transient signal injection
should be synchronized with the operation of the controller or
whether the transient should be injected asynchronously. If the
transient is injected synchronously, it must be introduced into the
controller during each operational state of the processor. Since the
number of states in a digital control system is very large, the
required amount of testing for this approach is impractical. For this
reason, asynchronous injection of a statistically significant number of
transient signals is more advantageous. In addition, asynchronously
injected transients can occur during the transition between states
and, therefore, more realistically represent the threat that could
occur in a natural environment.
C. Controller Monitoring Strategies
In single channel systems, upset modes can be fairly easily
detected using comparison monitoring techniques on a test unit and
reference unit executing identical software and operating in bit
synchronism. Any time the data bus, address bus, or control lines of
the test unit differ from those of the reference unit, data can be
recorded and analyzed. In this way, data is only recorded for
transient injections from which errors have occurred. (It was
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established in [21 and [31 that the occurrence and type of upset
depends on the relative timing of the transient injection and the
state of the processor. For this reason, upset does not occur each
time the transient signal enters the system.) An advantage to this
technique is that, since error-free data is not recorded, the amount of
required data reduction is reduced. In addition, this method
inherently provides very broad upset detection criteria.
Conversely, upset detection in fault-tolerant systems is much
more complex. Fault-tolerant controllers usually employ one of two
basic redundancy strategies - voting or primary/secondary channels.
Comparison monitoring techniques cannot be used in upset testing of
fault-tolerant systems since reconfigurations in the test unit would
cause miscomparisons to be generated without faulty operation being
present. For these types of systems, upset detection criteria must be
carefully selected since they effectively define upset for the test unit.
D. Data Acquisition
It is recommended that both analog and digital data be
recorded during upset tests. The analog data to be recorded are the
waveforms induced in the digital controller. In this way, various
threshold characteristics of transient signals that cause upset can be
determined. Norms such as peak absolute amplitude, maximum
absolute rate of rise, peak absolute impulse, rectified impulse, and
root action integral have been suggested in the literature for
measuring NEMP stress waveform attributes [13]. These norms were
used in an NEMP upset study and found to be inadequate [7].
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Therefore, appropriate frequency-dependent norms for
characterizing upset stress attributes of electromagnctically induced
transient signals from sources such as lightning, HERF, and NEMP
remains a topic for further research.
Digital data to be acquired from the controller should include
the calculated control commands obtained from the data bus, the
internal status word of the processor, as well as the address bus and
appropriate processor control lines. Range checks can be used to
determine if the calculated control commands are appropriate for tile
control regime in progress. Commands that would be acceptable in
one control mode could be devastating in another, so calculated
command data can only be evaluated in the context of the
application. The internal status word of the processor should be
monitored for the results of self tests, parity checks, and other fault-
tolerant strategies that might be present in the digital controller
under test. Monitoring the results of the processor's own self-health
evaluation can signal the beginning of a functional error mode or
upset. Upset modes that occur without indication from self-health
checks may suggest self tests that could be effective against upset in
future processor designs. Monitoring address bus activity establishes
cases in which the processor accesses invalid or nonexistent memory
space. When this happens, the processor executes whatever data
word it finds there as a valid instruction and often never returns to
the correct memory space or correct operation until the system is
reinitialized. Monitoring the control lines of the processor establishes
the operational mode of the processor and, therefore, enables the
experimenter to determine if invalid memory space data has been
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decoded as an instruction. Exact details of the digital data acquisition
are dependent on the controller under test.
In redundant systems with voting, the digital data described
above must be obtained from all processors as well as the voter, and
reconfiguration data must also be obtained. In redundant systems
with primary/secondary channels, the digital data described above
as well as the flags and signals related to which channel is in primary
control and which is commanding the various control loops must be
recorded. Digital data recorded from multiprocessor systems should
be time-stamped so that concurrent activities of processors in the
system can be correlated for post processing.
III. Case Study: Upset Test Set-up for a Fault-Tolerant Engine
Controller
The upset test methodology for digital controllers described in
Section II is planned to be applied to an electronic engine control
(EEC) unit. The EEC is a commercial controller manufactured by the
Hamilton Standard Division of United Technologies, which provides
electronic controls for Pratt & Whitney engines. The EEC is a full-
authority engine controller and is a dual-channel system which
operates with a primary/secondary channel strategy. A block
diagram of the EEC is shown in Fig. 4. As shown in the diagram, the
EEC receives signals from the airframe, actuator position sensors, and
engine parameter sensors. The inputs to each channel are also
available to the other channel so that the best inputs can be selected
by both channels. The control commands are calculated with the
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selected inputs and one output is selected to be sent to the actuators.
In addition to its control function, the EEC performs a comprehensive
self-health evaluation during background activity.
The EEC to be used in the test set-up is a modified version of
the commercial unit. Modifications to the EEC include access to the
data bus, address bus, and control lines of the microprocessors of
each channel to enable measurements in the laboratory. In addition,
nominal flight parameter values for eight different flight conditions
are stored in Read Only Memory (ROM) as well as the nominal values
for all but three of the engine parameters. The eight flight conditions
to be used during tests are take-off, cruise, acceleration, deceleration,
reverse, idle, partial power, and climb. The variable inputs to the
EEC are Throttle Resolver Angle (TRA), Inlet Air Temperature (T2),
and Engine Speed (N1). These inputs can be varied for the eight
flight cases during testing, and will be initially generated as shown in
Fig. 5. The TRA input will be generated using a resolver, T2 will be
generated using a resistive potentiometer, and N1 will be generated
using a pulse generator. Therefore, for initial tests, the EEC will be
running open-loop and the calculated commands will be stored in
memory. In the next testing phase, these three loops will be closed
so that the dynamics of the controller and plant can be simulated in
real time. Subsequent plans are to modify the EEC so that additional
variable inputs are provided.
During testing, each processor in both the test unit and
reference unit will be monitored for activity on the data bus, address
bus, and control lines. Upset for the EEC will initially be defined as: _
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(i) Selected parameter values for N1, T2, TRA are out of range
for n cycles;
(ii) Calculated control commands are out of range for the given
flight mode for n cycles;
(iii) Invalid memory space is accessed for n cycles.
Indication of the occurrence of any of these activities on the data
bus, address bus, and control lines of the processors in the test unit
will result in the data being recorded for that test run. As testing
proceeds, the list of activities defining upset for the EEC will be
expanded as necessary.
A block diagram of the upset test instrumentation is shown in
Fig. 6. The damped sinusoidal waveform of Fig. 3 is generated by a
polynomial waveform synthesizer and amplified by a wideband
power amplifier with a maximum output power of 1000 W and a
frequency range of 10 kHz - 220 MHz. This analog signal is
inductively coupled into the EEC and the induced waveform is
recorded on a waveform digitizer/analyzer on which some analysis,
such as FFT and energy/power spectrum, can be performed directly.
Digital data from the EEC is recorded on a digital analysis system
with 240 input lines that can capture data from four microprocessors
simultaneously with time correlation. Data can be displayed on the
digital analysis system in timing, state, or graphical format. Analog
and digital data from the waveform digitizer/recorder and the digital
analysis system are then transferred via IEEE 488 bus to a personal
12
computer, which is used for some of the analysis, display of data, and
transmission to a VAX 11/750 for further analysis.
IV. Future Work
Upset tests will be performed on the EEC in both an open-loop
and a closed-loop configuration in order to compare upset
characteristics relative to each of these modes. The analog signals
induced on the EEC will be recorded and appropriate norms will be
defined which characterize upset stress thresholds. Digital data
recorded from the EEC will be scrutinized for selected inputs that are
out of range, calculated commands which are inappropriate for the
given flight regime, accesses to invalid memory space, and problems
which are flagged by self-health tests.
The objectives of initial testing are to demonstrate the
methodology, establish an upset data base for a fault-tolerant control
system, define characteristic induced waveform threshold norms for
upset stress, and obtain statistical information about upset in a fault-
tolerant controller. Long range goals include the development of on-
line upset detection and correction strategies, upset tolerant design
techniques, an upset assessment tool for data analysis, and an upset
reliability estimation procedure.
SUMMARY
An upset test methodology is being developed for fault-
tolerant control systems and applied to the upset test design of an
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electronic engine controller. The methodology involves generating
electrical transients like those that would occur naturally in a
lightning environment, coupling these signals into a controller under
test, and collecting both analog and digital data from the controller
during tests. The primary objective of this methodology is to
develop assessment techniques for fault-tolerant control systems
operating in electromagnetically harsh environments due to
lightning, HERF, and NEMP. The motivation for the development of
assessment techniques is the trends in the aeronautics industry
towards flight-critical digital control systems onboard advanced
composite aircraft.
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